United Nations A/67/751

General Assembly

Distr.: General
21 February 2013

Original: English

Sixty-seventh session
Agenda items 140 and 146

Report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Comprehensive report on pilot project designated by the General Assembly in resolution 63/287

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

Summary

Endorsing the relevant observations and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/66/779/Add.1), the General Assembly, in its resolution 66/265, requested the Secretary-General to submit, in the context of the proposed support account budget for 2013/14, a final report on the pilot project that it had requested in its resolution 63/287. That report was to include a complete assessment of the findings and conclusions resulting from the experience gained during the full period of the pilot project, details on the full consultations with all relevant stakeholders, a breakdown of the utilization of resources during the pilot period and a more detailed analysis of the proposed establishment of an office in Entebbe.

The present report responds to this request. The compilation and final analysis of data gained over the duration of the entire pilot project provides the following conclusions:

- The most effective utilization of Office of Internal Oversight Services resources is an increased presence in the missions supported by regional centres of investigation
- Resident presence adds significant value to programme delivery in that it facilitates more timely responses to reported matters, observation of the mission environment, collection of case-specific information and development of trust in the investigative process

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- In missions with resident investigative capacity, a minimum of three investigators is required to provide effective programme delivery. Beyond this threshold, resident team size should be based on expected case load and available operational support
- Regional centres would support missions without resident capacity as well as missions where resident capacity needs to be supplemented temporarily to meet demands
- Difficulty in recruiting and retaining resident investigative staff continued to be a constraint that affected implementation of the pilot structure

The analyses and conclusions in connection with the pilot project on the structure of the Investigations Division of OIOS will be reflected in the proposed budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014.

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I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 63/287, the General Assembly decided not to introduce the restructuring of the delivery of investigation services in field missions as proposed by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) (see A/63/767 and Corr.1, para. 688). The central concept in the proposed restructuring at that time was to relocate investigators from field missions to regional centres or hubs in New York, Vienna and Nairobi, while providing for the transitional presence of two to three investigators in three missions with larger caseloads. The General Assembly decided instead to designate as a pilot project, from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2012, centres of investigation in Nairobi, Vienna and New York, and to retain investigators in seven missions.

2. In paragraph 40 of resolution 63/287, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit, in the context of the 2012/13 support account budget, after full consultations with all relevant stakeholders, integrating in particular the comments and observations of field missions, a comprehensive report on the pilot project to enable the General Assembly to decide on a restructuring of the Investigations Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services. As that comprehensive report (A/66/755) was submitted for consideration by the General Assembly at the second part of its resumed sixty-sixth session as requested, it could cover only the first 30 months of the 36-month pilot period. Subsequently, the General Assembly, in endorsing the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in its resolution 66/265, decided to consider the comprehensive report as an interim report, so that OIOS would benefit from a comprehensive assessment of the entire period of the pilot project. It requested the Secretary-General to submit a final report on the pilot project in the context of the proposed support account budget for 2013/14, and to include in that report a complete assessment of the findings and conclusions resulting from the experience gained during the full period of the pilot project, details on the full consultations with all relevant stakeholders, and a breakdown of the utilization of resources during the pilot period. The present report responds to that request.

3. The General Assembly also requested a more detailed analysis of the proposed establishment of an office in Entebbe. As this relates to a transfer of functions from one location (Nairobi) to another, rather than to the concept of a regional centre, the proposal and justification are contained in the proposed support account budget for 2013/14.

4. This is the third report on the pilot project. A preliminary report (A/65/765) was submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at the second part of its resumed sixty-fifth session in accordance with paragraph 39 of resolution 63/287. Full further information on the background is contained in paragraphs 6 to 13 of the comprehensive report submitted at the sixty-sixth session (A/66/755).

II. Methodology and scope

5. The assessment of the pilot project included analysis of the evolution and management of the investigations caseload, including its distribution among centres and resident investigators; review of the deployment of staff and assessment of vacancy and staffing-related matters; quantitative analysis of the time spent by

investigators;[1] formal solicitation of views from mission leadership, other stakeholders and staff members of the OIOS Investigations Division; and examination of resource utilization from 30 July 2009 to 30 June 2012.

6. The scope was designed to gain clarity on the basic organizational structure and delivery model so as to enable effective utilization of existing resources. The entire project period assessments in the current report are presented in accordance with support account budget periods, i.e., 2009/10 ("Year 1"), 2010/11 ("Year 2") and 2011/12 ("Year 3") from 1 July to 30 June respectively.

III. Deployment and utilization of resources

7. Annex I to the present report provides a summary overview of salient information related to the deployment and utilization of OIOS resources during the pilot project.

Posts and positions

8. The staff resources related to the pilot project have their origins in deployment approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 63/287. There were 43 Professional posts and positions, of which 31 were based in the three regional centres, and 12 were located in seven missions. The capacity approved for these field presences ranged from one person in four missions, to four Professional staff members in the United Nations Mission in the Sudan. Supporting these 43 Professional posts and positions were 13 General Service posts and positions and 1 Field Service post. Table 1 below shows the existing structure prior to the pilot project; table 2 outlines the deployment envisaged in the original OIOS proposal, which was not adopted by the General Assembly; tables 3 and 4 show the evolution of deployment during the course of the pilot project from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2012:

Table 1
Office of Internal Oversight Services: support account authorized for 2008/09

Office	*Management*	*Investigator*	*Total Professional*	*General Service*	*Total*
New York	–	1 P-3	1	1	2
Nairobi	–	3 P-4, 5 P-3	8	2	10
Vienna	1 D-1, 1 P-5	2 P-4, 7 P-3	11	4	15
UNMIT	–	1 P-4, 1 P-3	2*	2*	4
UNIFIL	–	1 P-4, 3 P-3	4*	2*	6
UNOCI	–	1 P-4, 3 P-3	4	1*	5
UNMIS	–	1 P-4, 4 P-3	5	1*	6
MINUSTAH	–	1 P-4, 3 P-3	4	3	7
MONUC	–	2 P-4, 6 P-3	8	5	13
UNMIL	–	1 P-4, 4 P-3	5	2	7
Total			**52**	**23**	**75**

* Posts.

[1] In January 2011, the Investigations Division of OIOS introduced a time-sheet analysis system to track all hours attributed to investigation resources.

Table 2
Posts and general temporary assistance positions included in the restructuring proposal for 2009 (A/63/767) (not implemented)

Office	*Management*	*Investigator*	*Professional support*	*Total*	*General Service*	*Total*
New York	1 P-5	4 P-4, 3 P-3	1 P-4, 2 P-3	11*	4*	15
Nairobi	1 D-1, 1 P-5	4 P-4, 9 P-3	1 P-4	16*	4*	20
Vienna		1 P-4, 3 P-3	1 P-4	5*	3*	8
UNMIS	–	1 P-4, 2 P-3	–	3	1	4
MONUC	–	1 P-4, 1 P-3	–	2	1	3
UNMIL	–	1 P-4, 2 P-3	–	3	1	4
Total				**40**	**14**	**54**

* Posts.

Table 3
Pilot project designated by the General Assembly in resolution 63/237: posts and general temporary assistance positions as at 1 July 2009

Office	*Management*	*Investigator*	*Professional support*	*Total*	*General Service*	*Field Service*	*Total*
New York	1 P-5	2 P-4, 1 P-3	1 P-4, 1 P-3	6	3	–	9
Nairobi	1 D-1, 1 P-5	3 P-4, 6 P-3	2 P-4, 1 P-3	14	5	–	19
Vienna	1 D-1, 1 P-5	1 P-4, 5 P-3	1 P-4, 2 P-3	11	3	–	14
UNMISS	–	1 P-4, 2 P-3	–	3	–	1*	4
MONUC	–	1 P-4, 1 P-3	–	2	1	–	3
UNMIL	–	1 P-4, 2 P-3	–	3	1	–	4
UNOCI	–	1 P-4	–	1	–	–	1
MINUSTAH	–	1 P-4	–	1	–	–	1
UNAMID**	–	1 P-4*	–	1	–	–	1
UNIFIL	–	1 P-4*	–	1	–	–	1
Total				**43**	**13**	**1**	**57**

* Posts.

** The General Assembly allocated funds for one resident investigator in UNMIT; however, given the Mission's decreasing operations and small size, OIOS redeployed the post to UNAMID.

Table 4
Posts and general temporary assistance positions as at 1 July 2012

Office	*Management*	*Investigator*	*Professional support*	*Total*	*General Service*	*Field Service*	*Total*
New York	1 P-5	2 P-4, 1 P-3	1 P-4, 1 P-3	6	3	–	9
Nairobi	1 D-1, 1 P-5	3 P-4, 6 P-3	2 P-4, 1 P-3	14	4	–	18
Vienna	1 D-1, 1 P-5	1 P-4, 5 P-3	1 P-4, 2 P-3	11	3	–	14
UNMISS	–	1 P-4, 2 P-3	–	3	–	1*	4
MONUC	–	1 P-4, 1 P-3	–	2	1	–	3
UNMIL	–	1 P-4, 2 P-3	–	3	1	–	4
UNOCI	–	1 P-4	–	1	–	–	1
MINUSTAH	–	1 P-4	–	1	–	–	1
UNAMID	–	1 P-4*	–	1	–	–	1
UNIFIL	–	1 P-4*	–	1	–	–	1
Total				**43**	**12**	**1**	**56****

* Posts.

** The decrease from 57 to 56 posts is attributed to the non-approval by the General Assembly of a proposed transfer of a general temporary assistance-funded General Service (Other level) position from Nairobi to the New York Professional Practices Section. The General Service (Other level) position in Nairobi instead was discontinued effective 1 July 2012.

9. The New York Headquarters of the OIOS Investigations Division provided certain central services for all locations. These included policy development, monitoring, planning and support for governance; quality assurance, and advice from the Professional Practices Section; and technical support from the Information Technology Forensic Unit. These central services support the investigations function as a whole, including, but not limited to investigations in field operations covered by the pilot project. Previously solely provided through New York, some of the related capacity, related in particular to professional practices and forensics, was decentralized to Vienna and Nairobi in order to enhance operational efficiency.

Financial resources

10. Table 5 summarizes the utilization of financial resources during the pilot project in relation to the approved allocation of $8.52 million for 2009/10, $8.85 million for 2010/11 and $9.47 million for 2011/12. Of the total support account budget of $26.84 million, $19.83 million (73.9 per cent) was utilized, owing primarily to vacancies.

Table 5
Utilization of financial resources
(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Year 1	*Year 2*	*Year 3*
	July 2009 to June 2010	*July 2010 to June 2011*	*July 2011 to June 2012*
Hub staff salary costs	3 372.4	3 537.1	5 214.5
Mission staff salary costs	1 197.6	1 572.4	1 832.9
Consultants (non-training)	7.8	6.1	4.5
Travel (non-training)	367.1	369.9	304.0
Facilities and infrastructure	104.7	96.3	180.2
Communications	34.5	91.6	27.0
Information technology	553.9	240.3	193.4
Other supplies, services and equipment (non-training)	50.8	58.7	104.3
Training			
Training — consultants	0.0	0.0	0.5
Training — travel	175.3	84.4	29.5
Training — other supplies, services, equipment	7.5	0.5	8.2
Total	**5 871.6**	**6 057.3**	**7 898.9**

Distribution of investigation responsibility

11. Under the pilot project, resident investigators in the seven missions where positions were approved were intended to have lead responsibility for investigations in those locations with support provided by the regional centres. Resources in the regional centres were also intended to handle peacekeeping-related investigations within their geographic location and proximity. Table 6 summarizes the distribution of responsibility among the regional centres.

Table 6
Distribution of area of responsibility

New York	*Vienna*	*Nairobi*
MINUSTAH	MINURSO	MINURCAT
	UNAMA	MONUC/MONUSCO
	UNDOF	UNAMID
	UNFICYP	UNMIL
	UNIFIL	UNMIS/UNMISS
	UNMIK	UNOCI
	UNMIT	
	UNTSO	

12. In order to reduce a backlog of cases, investigations stemming from UNOCI and UNMIL were temporarily assigned to the New York regional centre from 16 November 2010 to 1 April 2012.

The work carried out

13. Annex I to the present report provides a summary of the statistical information garnered during the pilot project. The caseloads by mission and investigation centre areas of responsibility are also summarized in table 7 below.

Table 7
Percentage of investigations by area of responsibility

Mission/Office	*Percentage of investigations*	*Investigation centre combined area of responsibility*	*Percentage of investigations*
New York	1	New York	21
MINUSTAH	20	–	–
Vienna	10	Vienna	12
UNIFIL	2	–	–
Nairobi	2	Nairobi	67
MONUC and MONUSCO	27	–	–
UNAMID	4	–	–
UNMIL	12	–	–
UNMIS and UNMISS	13	–	–
UNOCI	9	–	–

14. During the pilot period, progress was made in tackling the caseload and reducing the backlog of open cases. The pilot period began with 185 open cases. During its three-year duration, a further 304 cases were presented for investigation, from within the 1,026 matters that had been drawn to the attention of OIOS, making a total of 489 cases for investigation. During the three years, 358 cases were disposed of, leaving 131 open cases: 25 per cent fewer than at the beginning of the pilot. The number of backlogged cases pending over 18 months was reduced by more than half, from 77 to 36. In addition to the 304 cases OIOS took for investigation, it also referred 333 matters back to missions to pursue.

15. Of the 1,026 matters examined by OIOS, 39 per cent were reported directly to OIOS.

16. A total of 118 sexual exploitation and abuse reports were received during the pilot project. The number of sexual exploitation and abuse reports decreased by 45 per cent from Year 1 (51) to Year 3 (28).

17. The 358 disposed cases led to 308 investigation reports issued by OIOS during the pilot project.[2] Of this number, 97 were issued by resident mission-based investigators. Resident investigators assigned to missions with two or more

[2] Not every investigation results in the issuance of an investigation report. For example, when two investigations are merged into one, they are both counted but only one report is issued.
Occasionally multiple reports have emanated from a single investigation, so the number of cases is not expected to match the number of reports.

investigators (UNMIL, MONUSCO and UNMISS) accounted for 87 of the 97 reports. Annex I shows the output in terms of reports for each mission. While a variety of factors affect the rate at which reports are concluded, it can be observed that missions with a single investigator had the greatest difficulty in completing reports.

18. Given the limited capacity provided and owing to the missions' high vacancy levels, all resident investigators relied on support from the centres to conduct or assist in investigations. As can be seen from annex I, of the 260 reports issued in relation to missions with resident investigators, those investigators completed 36 per cent of them. The rest were completed by personnel based at the regional centres.

OIOS continued to investigate troop-contributing country-related cases

19. OIOS had anticipated that the Revised Model Memorandum of Understanding with troop-contributing countries as approved by the General Assembly in 2007, would substantially free up its investigative resources for deployment to other category I cases. However, this materialized only to a limited extent. From 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2012, OIOS investigated a total of 126 troop-contributing country-related cases. Of this number, 76 cases required OIOS to commit investigative resources either for the purposes of joint investigation with a National Investigation Officer or for sole investigation by OIOS owing to the absence of a response from the troop-contributing countries following official notification of the alleged wrongdoing. Only 45 of the 126 troop-contributing country-related matters were investigated exclusively by national Governments. The remaining five cases were referred to the exclusive jurisdiction of the mission owing to their lower levels of seriousness.

Challenges in recruitment and retention

20. OIOS also faced serious challenges in recruitment with an average monthly vacancy rate of 45 per cent in the 12 Professional positions as allocated to the seven missions. As the pilot project unfolded, this rate was eventually reduced to 33 per cent. Despite its best efforts, OIOS was unable to staff UNOCI during the entire pilot project owing to the evacuation of the UNOCI mission in 2011 and selected candidates withdrawing prior to actual deployment. By contrast, the average monthly vacancy rate for the centres was reduced from 39 per cent to 17 per cent upon conclusion of the pilot project.

Correlation of leave provisions in missions to investigator availability

21. Rest and recuperation policies provide staff members serving in missions up to six additional weeks of leave per year. As leave entitlements are coordinated by the administration offices of each respective mission, OIOS sought confirmation of the number of days utilized by OIOS investigators in this regard. However, only the Administration Offices of UNMIL and UNMISS responded to the request, indicating that mission-based OIOS investigators had utilized 84 additional leave days under the rest and recuperation policies over the course of the entire pilot project. Notwithstanding the lack of available information, the OIOS Internal Audit Division has noted that mission-based auditors have 150 available work days in a given year as compared to their counterparts in headquarters-based audit offices

with 190 available work days. This 27 per cent discrepancy in available work days applies to OIOS investigators as well.

Percentage of operational hours versus administrative hours

22. Following the introduction of time sheets in January 2011, it was determined that investigators in missions had less available time to devote to investigations (61 per cent of the work day) compared to their counterparts in centres (at 66 per cent). This discrepancy was not unexpected given the greater number of support staff in the centres in addition to some of the demands unique to the mission environment (vehicle maintenance, security restrictions, etc.).

General Assembly resolutions 57/282 and 59/287 — Training and development

23. OIOS has developed eight training modules to address, in part, the chronic deficit of professional investigative expertise in the Organization. These include modules on the issues of programme manager awareness; investigation practice; investigating procurement matters; investigating sexual harassment; investigating sexual exploitation and abuse; advance interviewing techniques; incident response; and information technology.[3] While feedback on the courses delivered prior to the pilot project was positive, OIOS acknowledges that a strong demand for additional training demonstrates both a lack of capacity and an unmet need. To address some of this demand, a joint initiative involving OIOS and the Department of Field Support, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Management was initiated from 29 May to 8 June 2012 in Entebbe to provide training on investigations to 30 participants from various peacekeeping missions. The training included the modules on investigation practice, investigating sexual exploitation and abuse, advance interviewing techniques and incident response.

24. An assessment of the training was conducted by the Inspection and Evaluation Division of OIOS in August 2012. A total of 29 of the 30 participants responded to the assessment. The feedback of the participants was very positive on all aspects.

IV. Comments and observations of relevant stakeholders

25. OIOS solicited the comments of mission leadership, Conduct and Discipline Units and investigators from the Special Investigations Unit of the Department of Safety and Security. It also solicited views of its own investigators.

26. A total of 10 responses were received from mission senior management. General comments focused on the following observations:

- Pilot project, by reducing or eliminating resident investigation capacity, does not meet the needs of the missions
- Investigations take too long to complete
- An adequately resourced OIOS mission presence is required
- Special Investigation Units require adequate training to deal with referral and lower-level allegations

[3] See A/62/7/Add.35, A/56/282 and A/58/708.

- OIOS is referring too many matters back to missions to investigate; missions have inadequate resources.

27. The submissions provided by Conduct and Discipline Units were in the same line:

- OIOS must have a mission presence and it must be adequately resourced
- Special Investigation Units must receive adequate training to deal with referral and lower-level allegations.

28. Comments from Special Investigation Units were received from only one mission:

- Special Investigation Units must receive adequate training to deal with referral and lower-level allegations
- General guidance and assistance from OIOS on investigative matters is routinely provided.

29. OIOS mission personnel also provided comments based on their own experiences expressing criticism of the practice of assigning lone investigators to missions. The point made is that the demands of working in an internal investigations environment can be strenuous enough, but to do so outside of a team environment in a peacekeeping mission can have a negative psychological impact on the individual. They also felt the designation of single-person (or inadequately staffed) units was detrimental to OIOS efforts to fill staff positions and in certain missions has led to strained relations between the mission management and OIOS. A comment was also made that the recruitment of personnel to general temporary assistance positions is not only more difficult but leads to recruited investigators seeking more secure employment elsewhere.

30. OIOS mission personnel were also concerned about the significance of D-1 and P-5 grades being assigned as Heads of Conduct and Discipline Units as compared to OIOS offices being managed by a P-4. The observation was presented in regard to operational effectiveness in working with mission counterparts and as an incentive for recruitment both in terms of meaningful career path and staff mobility.

V. Assessment of the findings and conclusions resulting from the experience gained

31. The experience during the past three years has demonstrated that the requirement is for a combination of regional centres and adequately staffed resident presences, rather than the complete replacement of resident investigators by regional centres. The pilot project initiated by the General Assembly in its resolution 63/287 was in fact such a combination. During the pilot period, the investigations funded by the support account were carried out by a combination of resident investigators and regional hubs. The pilot project was a vehicle for organizational learning as it simultaneously demonstrated the advantages and the necessity of resident investigators while also highlighting complex and interconnected challenges.

32. During the pilot period, OIOS was able to reduce the outstanding caseload and address new cases, despite a high, though improving, level of vacancies. Owing

partly to these vacancy rates, much of the caseload relating to missions with investigator positions was tackled by personnel based in regional hubs rather than the missions. This shows that volume can be handled from either venue, as long as OIOS maintains a capacity to deploy qualified investigators.

Advantages of mission-based investigators

33. OIOS and mission management agree that resident investigators provide clear advantages. Their presence facilitates more timely responses to reported matters, first-hand observation of the mission environment, efficient collection of case-specific information and the building of trust in the investigative process. Mission management can also more readily access professional investigative advice, and consult with investigators on sensitive matters linked to issues of individual accountability. Feedback from mission management has consistently urged the building of resident investigative capacity.

34. While the presence of resident investigators is associated with a higher incidence of reported violations, uncertainty remains regarding the cause/effect relationship of these two factors, or the extent to which other factors also affect volumes of reported matters. Nevertheless a total of 39 per cent of all matters (including 28 per cent of the sexual exploitation and abuse cases) were initiated directly through OIOS. Having OIOS investigators on site enhances communication with mission staff and provides an independent mechanism for reporting wrongdoing. In addition and perhaps more importantly, OIOS investigators working in the field missions provide victims and staff of non-governmental organizations working with victims of sexual exploitation and abuse access to a reporting mechanism, as most of them otherwise have no knowledge of, or access to, formal reporting procedures.

35. As stated above, the presence of resident investigators is associated with a higher number of reported matters of wrongdoing. Such higher incidence of reporting should be considered an advantage, as staff members have the duty to report any breach of the Organization's regulations and rules to officials whose responsibility it is to take appropriate action.[4] Since staff members may be reluctant to report such matters to their supervisors or management, accessibility to resident investigators makes it easier for staff to fulfil this responsibility. Overall this creates a better-informed Organization, which enables greater accountability and other mechanisms to both identify and address any systemic problems that may arise.

36. Based on these positive factors, there is a convincing case for the continued presence of an adequate number of resident investigators during the life cycle of a mission when so warranted by an assessment of associated risks.

37. Notwithstanding the positive attributes of a resident investigator presence, the pilot project also demonstrated that positioning a single position/investigator in a peacekeeping mission has serious drawbacks. While these difficulties include those outlined in staff recruitment and retention, it also includes the inability to proceed with professional investigations without drawing upon supplementary resources to ensure that at least two investigators are present for all interviews and interactions involved. In addition, it was observed that reports issued by investigators assigned to a single position within the mission environment were minimal. The fact that in

[4] Staff rule 1.2 (c).

most mission settings, international staff have leave or other approved absences of up to 12 weeks a year reinforces the non-viability of assigning lone investigators.

38. Positioning single investigators in missions also has other risks as "the job [mission-based investigator], by its very nature, tends to isolate investigators from other mission staff".[5] As an investigator's profession requires adherence to the highest standards of objectivity, extended deployments of investigators, especially single investigators, in a mission can create subtle but real risks to their independence. Additional risks for single investigators in the mission environment can include personal security concerns.

39. It has also been noted that during the pilot period the highest vacancy rates were associated with those missions with only one investigator position.

40. The collective evidence indicates that if OIOS is to retain an on-site lead investigative capacity in any mission, the unit should, as a minimum, be comprised of three investigators.

Proximate centres are indispensable to support and supplement resident capacity

41. While resident capacity is beneficial, it needs to be complemented by adequately resourced and geographically proximate centres of investigation that can undertake investigations in missions where the caseload cannot justify a resident team, and provide necessary support to resident investigators. Experience also demonstrates that recruiting and retaining investigators based in centres is easier than for resident investigators. The availability of a critical mass of investigative capacity, including specialized skills, professional practices, quality assurance and support, situated close to missions, provides more flexibility to respond to temporary spikes in volume and to matters deemed high-risk or particularly time-sensitive.

42. Deployment of investigators from centres to supplement and support resident investigators can also partly ease the austere conditions under which the majority of field investigations take place. Centres are somewhat shielded from factors or events that can disrupt, and even immobilize, mission environments. They offer enhanced opportunities for staff learning and collaboration, reduced impediments to operational independence, and improved positioning of the Investigations Division to develop and implement a staff mobility and rotation plan.

Recruitment and staff retention

43. The difficulty of staff recruitment and retention for mission service was one of the main reasons for the initial proposal to shift towards regional centres. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has duly noted these challenges.[5] It is pertinent that, even though it was conducted prior to the pilot project, a mid-2007 survey of the staff in the Investigations Division showed that a very high percentage of mission-based investigators were strongly desirous of leaving the mission environment. The staff retention rates and comments submitted by OIOS personnel during the pilot project suggest that that factor is still relevant today.

[5] See A/62/7/Add.35, para. 13.

44. OIOS acknowledges that recruitment and staff retention will always be a factor impacting upon its programme delivery, especially in the peacekeeping environment. Drawing on the experience during the pilot project, including the importance of residence presence for mission leadership (and case intake and continuity), OIOS considers that strategies other than phasing out resident presence should be applied. First, aggressive action should be continued to fill posts and positions as this has produced results as reflected in the reduced vacancy rates. Consideration is also being given to other measures to enhance career opportunities and to rotate to different assignments periodically so that there is a mix of severe and less severe conditions. Current and future targeted areas for enhancement of the recruitment process include:

- Advertisements of job openings to establish a list of roster candidates
- Vacancy announcements that more accurately reflect the most suitable skills needed in the peacekeeping environment
- The possible creation with the Office of Human Resources Management of a specific Investigator job family
- Publication of job opportunities beyond Inspira.

45. OIOS personnel recommended the establishment of P-5 level heads of office for any OIOS office located in a peacekeeping mission. The observation was presented in regard to operational effectiveness and as an incentive for staff recruitment and staff retention. It is generally acknowledged that the establishment of P-5 posts within the peacekeeping environment would provide a more defined career path for OIOS investigators in addition to facilitating staff mobility. OIOS, however, also equates the increase in authority to an increase in responsibility. With this consideration in mind, OIOS envisages opportunities to redeploy some positions currently allocated to quality control.

VI. Detailed analysis of establishing an OIOS office in Entebbe

46. Different duty stations have different cost structures and in every case, the most significant cost factor is staff. This is evidenced by the fact that it is more expensive to retain international staff in mission locations than in regional centres — about 21 per cent more expensive. For example, a P-4 investigator post in the regional offices of New York, Vienna and Nairobi will average $189,000 combined salary and common staff charges for the period 2013/14 while the same level post in the seven peacekeeping missions participating in the pilot project would average $229,483. The higher cost of mission presence is offset to a degree by lower travel and communications costs.

47. Annex II to the present report provides a summary of a cost-benefit analysis of establishing an OIOS office in Entebbe by comparing (a) the post allocations originally proposed in A/63/767; (b) full implementation of the current pilot project; (c) mission-based allotments on the basis of caseload percentages; and (d) allotment of resident investigators on the basis of appropriate caseloads supported by regional investigative centres in New York, Vienna and Entebbe.

48. Given that 47 per cent of all investigations during the pilot project originated in the East Africa region, there are clear benefits to establishing an OIOS office in

Entebbe. They would include significantly reduced travel costs with the utilization of scheduled United Nations flights, a more immediate response to reports of serious misconduct or to resident investigators requiring investigative or other support during periods of leave/vacancies and a centralized location to provide training to both OIOS and non-OIOS investigators at reduced travel and daily subsistence allowance costs. In addition to significant savings on common staff charges (as compared to the mission environment), given that Entebbe is a family duty station OIOS envisages benefits to its overall staff recruitment, retention and mobility initiatives.

49. As the Regional Service Centre concept expands OIOS envisages increased numbers of investigations stemming from Entebbe proper. Utilizing Entebbe as its African-based investigation centre, OIOS would be well positioned for such an increase notwithstanding the fact that unlike Nairobi, Entebbe also provides the Organization a mission presence at significantly reduced costs combined with increased operational and administrative efficiencies. For those reasons, OIOS supports realignment of available resources to the Entebbe and other Regional Service Centres as envisioned in A/64/633 and the Secretary-General's overall global field support strategy.

VII. Conclusion

50. The review of the pilot project, including the stakeholder's comments, has drawn out the importance attached to accessible OIOS investigative services. It also identified strain in the OIOS support to missions as the capacities of both sides are stretched to their limits. The increased demands on OIOS go beyond a mission presence to include proactive fraud investigations, fewer referrals of category I matters and the provision of enhanced training programmes for non-OIOS investigators. While OIOS anticipates a greater efficiency of its resources through its 2013/14 support account and by changes to its operational procedures, it also acknowledges significant challenges in addressing these demands within the current financial environment.

51. The pilot project was also beneficial in establishing the importance of an OIOS presence in the peacekeeping environment. Those missions with a significant number of allegations of staff misconduct are best served by an adequately staffed OIOS presence. The remaining missions are best served by a regional OIOS component that can also provide, when necessary, support to any peacekeeping mission. In the application of such criteria, OIOS also recognizes the efficiencies to be gained by alignment of its regional resources within the Regional Service Centre structure.

52. The foregoing findings and conclusions of the pilot project have been reflected in the proposed support account budget for 2013/14, in consideration of which, OIOS has applied the following practical criteria and objectives:

- To maintain an appropriate and proportional caseload per investigator, subject to exceptional factors, to ensure adequate capacity
- To facilitate training programmes for non-OIOS investigators assigned within any of the Department of Field Support and Department of Peacekeeping Operations global networks

- To reduce costs and improve efficiency, including by drawing on the facilities and services of Regional Service Centres
- To improve timeliness of investigations from the point of receipt of an allegation to issuance of its investigative findings
- To improve retention of investigators by creating opportunities for rotation between missions and centres as well as other administrative initiatives to enhance recruitment and staff retention
- To maintain the capacity of the Division to interact with stakeholders and to support the deliberations of Member States and intergovernmental processes.

VIII. Action to be taken by the General Assembly

53. The General Assembly may wish to take note of the present report in consideration of the proposed support account budget for 2013/14.

(*Signed*) Carman L. **Lapointe**
Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services

Annex I

Statistical information garnered during the pilot project

	MINUSTAH	*MONUC/ MONUSCO*	*UNAMID*	*UNIFIL*	*UNMIL*	*UNMIS/ UNMISS*	*UNOCI*	*All other missions*[b]	*Total*	*Totals by location*
Total establishment[a]	1	3	1	1	4	4	1	41	56	Missions — 15 Centres — 41
Investigator positions[c]	1	2	1	1	3	3	1	Nairobi — 13 New York — 6 Vienna — 13	44	Missions — 12 Centres — 32
Vacancy rate[d] (percentage)	83	26	58	69	35	23	100	39	41	Missions — 45 Centres — 39
Case intake[e]	140	219	76	23	124	121	86	237	1 026	Missions — 789 Others — 237
Initiated by OIOS[f] (number/ percentage)	46/33%	94/43%	33/44%	4/18%	43/35%	52/43%	44/52%	85/36%	401/39%	Missions — 316 Others — 85
Investigations commenced[g]	60	83	13	5	36	41	28	38	304	Missions — 266 Others — 38
Percentage of investigations[h]	20	27	4	2	12	13	9	Nairobi — 2 New York — 1 Vienna — 10	100	Missions — 87 Centres — 13
Sexual exploitation and abuse investigations[i]	17	61	0	0	17	13	10	0	118	Missions — 118 Others — 0
Referrals to mission[j]	Cat. I — 19 Cat. II — 28	Cat. I — 32 Cat. II — 38	Cat. I — 6 Cat. II — 19	Cat. I — 1 Cat. II — 3	Cat. I — 15 Cat. II — 16	Cat. I — 19 Cat. II — 37	Cat. I — 5 Cat. II — 22	Cat. I — 24 Cat. II — 68	Cat. I — 117 Cat. II — 216	Missions — 241 Others — 92
Reports issued[k]	42	87	11	12	52	27	29	48	308	Missions — 260 Others — 48

	MINUSTAH	*MONUC/ MONUSCO*	*UNAMID*	*UNIFIL*	*UNMIL*	*UNMIS/ UNMISS*	*UNOCI*	*All other missions*[b]	*Total*	*Totals by location*
Mission reports[l]	0/0%	31/36%	10/99%	0/0%	36/70%	20/74%	0/0%	46/99%	100%	Missions — 34% Others — 99%
Travel costs[m] (United States dollars)	88 344	126 102	8 516	15 133	84 433	29 481	53 572	120 315	525 896	Missions — 405 581 Others — 120 315

[a] Establishment — Includes all administrative and operational support positions/posts.
[b] All other missions — MINURCAT (Closed) and UNSOA — Nairobi area of responsibility/Headquarters — New York area of responsibility/UNAMA, UNDOF, UNFICYP, UNLB, UNMIK, UNMIT, UNOMIG, UNTSO — Vienna area of responsibility.
[c] Investigator positions/posts only; does not include administrative or operational support staff.
[d] Vacancy rate — International/Professional Staff only — average vacancy rate over course of entire pilot project.
[e] Case intake — Total number of cases by location of occurrence.
[f] Initiated by OIOS — Number of cases initiated directly by OIOS as compared to other official reporting mechanisms; number/percentage of total reports issued.
[g] Investigations commenced — Total number of investigations by geographical location; does not indicate where investigations were actually assigned.
[h] Percentage of investigations — By mission; percentage of total number of investigations commenced by OIOS during pilot project.
[i] Sexual exploitation and abuse investigations — Out of the total number of investigations in the mission — number associated with sexual exploitation and abuse.
[j] Referrals to the missions — Number of category I and category II cases referred to the Missions.
[k] Reports issued — Total number of reports issued per mission during the pilot project (by any OIOS investigator).
[l] Mission reports — Number of reports (by mission) issued by mission staff during pilot project; i.e., for MONUSCO — Mission-based investigators issued 31 of the 87 MONUSCO reports — the remaining would have been issued by investigators from one of the regional centres.
[m] Travel costs — Travel costs to the designated mission during the pilot project for the purposes of conducting an investigation (airfare, daily subsistence allowance and terminal costs).

Annex II

Cost-benefit analysis of establishing an OIOS office in Entebbe

	OIOS 2009 proposal	*No change*	*Mission-based*	*Regional Service Centre, Entebbe*
Framework	As envisioned by A/63/767, OIOS would maintain regional offices in New York, Nairobi and Vienna with resident investigators in MONUSCO, UNMIL and UNMISS.	Current pilot project. OIOS would maintain regional offices in New York, Nairobi and Vienna with resident investigators in MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNIFIL, UNMIL, UNMISS and UNOCI.	Assignment of investigators based on percentage of case load. Owing to low caseload volumes at the mission level, Vienna would retain investigations for peacekeeping missions in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Beyond Professional and administrative support positions in New York, current caseloads would not support the presence of dedicated investigators in New York, Nairobi, UNIFIL or UNAMID.	Assignment of resident investigators based on caseload supported by regional investigative centres of New York, Vienna and Entebbe. D-1 Entebbe (peacekeeping) and D-1 Vienna (training and Europe/Asia/Middle East Representative). Eastern regions of MONUSCO to be served by the Entebbe Office, which would include an expert sexual exploitation and abuse investigations team able to provide assistance to any peacekeeping mission
Number of combined positions/posts	54	56	56	56
Hypothetical establishments	New York 1 P-5, 5 P-4, 5 P-3, 4 General Service Nairobi 1 D-1, 1 P-5, 5 P-4, 9 P-3, 4 General Service Vienna 2 P-4, 3 P-3, 3 General Service	New York 1 P-5, 3 P-4, 2 P-3, 3 General Service Nairobi 1 D-1, 1 P-5, 5 P-4, 7 P-3, 4 General Service Vienna 1 D-1, 1 P-5, 2 P-4, 7 P-3, 3 General Service UNMISS 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 Field Service	New York 1 D-1, 1 P-3, 4 General Service Vienna 1 D-1, 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 4 P-3, 3 General Service UNMISS 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 3 P-3, 1 national General Service MONUSCO 1 P-5, 3 P-4, 8 P-3, 1 national General Service	New York 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 3 General Service Vienna 1 D1, 1 P-5, 3 P-4, 4 P-3, 3 General Service Entebbe 1 D-1, 1 P-5, 3 P-4, 3 P-3, 1 Field Service, 1 national General Service

	OIOS 2009 proposal	*No change*	*Mission-based*	*Regional Service Centre, Entebbe*
	UNMISS 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 General Service MONUSCO 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 General Service UNMIL 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 General Service	MONUSCO 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 national General Service UNMIL 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 national General Service UNOCI 1 P-4 MINUSTAH 1 P-4 UNAMID 1 P-4 UNIFIL 1 P-4	UNMIL 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 3 P-3, 1 national General Service UNOCI 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 national General Service MINUSTAH 1 P-5, 2 P-4, 6 P-3, 1 national General Service	UNMISS 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 3 P-3, 1 national General Service MONUSCO 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 national General Service UNMIL 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 3 P-3, 1 national General Service UNOCI 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 national General Service MINUSTAH 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 3 P-3, 1 national General Service
2013/14 salary and common staff charges (United States dollars)	8 167 900	8 801 900	9 954 024	9 474 000
Travel costs	Known travel costs would increase owing to (a) an inadequate number of investigators in designated missions, and (b) no investigators in other missions that require an OIOS presence.	Travel costs would remain relatively constant. Estimated annual travel costs based on previous travel.	Potential to eliminate majority of peacekeeping-related travel ($407,346 incurred over three-year period) except to those missions that do not justify a full time OIOS presence ($116,769 incurred over three-year period).	Potential to significantly reduce peacekeeping-related travel ($407,346 over three-year period) except to those missions that do not justify a full time OIOS presence ($116,769 incurred over three-year period). Remaining mission-related travel costs would benefit from the utilization of United Nations flights based out of the Regional Service Centre, Entebbe providing travel to missions that currently encompass 41 per cent of the OIOS caseload.
Staff recruitment/retention	The proposal would have a limited impact on current OIOS recruitment initiatives.	The proposal would have no impact on current OIOS recruitment initiatives.	The proposal would have a detrimental impact on OIOS recruitment owing to the large number of mission-based positions. Vacancies would increase.	The proposal would improve OIOS recruitment initiatives owing to the higher number of positions in family duty stations and adequately resourced missions (i.e., no single investigator posts).

	OIOS 2009 proposal	*No change*	*Mission-based*	*Regional Service Centre, Entebbe*
Staff mobility	The proposal would have little impact on OIOS mobility initiatives.	The proposal would have no impact on OIOS mobility initiatives.	The proposal would have a positive impact on OIOS mobility initiatives owing to more P-5 positions facilitating career advancement within OIOS.	The proposal would have an optimal impact on OIOS mobility initiatives owing to more P-5 positions facilitating career advancement within OIOS and more positions in family duty stations as compared to resident investigator positions.
Mission stakeholders	The proposal fails to meet the expressed needs of the mission stakeholders.	The proposal fails to meet the expressed needs of the mission stakeholders.	The proposal would meet the operational needs expressed by the mission stakeholders by providing investigative resources.	The proposal would meet the operational and training needs of the mission stakeholders by providing investigative and training resources.
OIOS mission presence	The proposal only partially provides the Organization the benefits of an on-site OIOS presence for those missions meeting a necessary threshold.	The proposal only partially provides the Organization the benefits of an on-site OIOS presence for those missions meeting a necessary threshold.	The proposal would provide the Organization the optimal benefits of an on-site OIOS presence for those missions meeting a necessary threshold.	The proposal would provide the Organization the benefits of an on-site OIOS presence for those missions meeting a necessary threshold.
Sexual exploitation and abuse	The proposal only partially meets the needs of the Organization in its commitment of zero tolerance towards sexual exploitation and abuse.	The proposal only partially meets the needs of the Organization in its commitment of zero tolerance towards sexual exploitation and abuse.	The proposal would meet the needs of the Organization in its commitment of zero tolerance towards sexual exploitation and abuse for those missions meeting a necessary threshold.	The proposal provides the Organization optimal benefits in its commitment of zero tolerance towards sexual exploitation and abuse by providing adequate mission presence and surge capacity when needed. Under the proposal, OIOS envisages the establishment of a team of sexual exploitation and abuse investigation experts based out of the Entebbe office (during the pilot project, the East Africa region accounted for 63 per cent of all OIOS sexual exploitation and abuse investigations).
OIOS operational support	The proposal enables OIOS to provide operational support to other missions.	The proposal enables OIOS to provide operational support to other missions.	The proposal restricts the capacity of OIOS to provide operational support to any mission requiring additional or temporary investigative resources.	The proposal enables OIOS to provide operational support to any mission requiring additional or temporary investigative resources.

	OIOS 2009 proposal	*No change*	*Mission-based*	*Regional Service Centre, Entebbe*
Summary	The pilot project has established that the proposal is no longer viable in that it fails to address the needs of the stakeholder or OIOS.	The pilot project has identified areas for improved efficiencies which dictate that the proposal is no longer viable.	The proposal meets the needs of the stakeholders but restricts the operational capacity of OIOS. It would also increase staff vacancies which have been identified as having a negative impact on OIOS operations and stakeholder expectations.	The proposal balances the needs of the stakeholder and OIOS operations against cost reductions and improved efficiencies in regard to staff recruitment and retention.